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Abstract
The economic consequences of migration have become the topic of many recent
contributions in theoretical and applied economics. However, only a handful of papers
have dealt with the implications of migration for risk sharing. We intend to fill in
this gap in the literature by exploring the effects of migration and the ensuing cultural
diversity on risk sharing in receiving economies, by using data on US states in the
period 2000-2015. Our empirical results strongly suggest that migration enhances risk
sharing in host economies, but non monotonically so. Moreover, cultural diversity is
key in this risk sharing-enhancing effect of migration.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers by Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994), risk
sharing (or consumption insurance) has been analysed under many different lenses, both
from the standpoint of its determinants, and from the perspective of its implications for
economic activities.
The main goal of this vast literature has been that of assessing the extent to which idiosyn-
cratic shocks, for example to income, are buffered ex ante or ex post, and do not get trans-
mitted to consumption. Moreover, a stream of literature originating from the seminal paper
of Asdrubali et al. (1996) has also assessed the relative contribution of several different
mechanisms in achieving a certain degree of risk sharing. On the other hand, migration has
also become a very hot topic in economics, with many contributions to date analyzing its
drivers, as well as its consequences on the functioning of economic systems. Moreover,
a more recent literature on migration-induced cultural diversity has also offered interest-
ing perspectives. This is meant to explore the socio-economic implications of variety in
migrants’ stocks, rather than just focusing on the stock of foreign born in a destination
country. Interesting motivations for considering cultural diversity as a factor impacting
economic variables have been often provided in the literature, and are discussed in the next
section.
The purpose and the intended contribution of this paper is to bridge these two streams of
literature, by empirically assessing the impact of migration and diversity on risk sharing.
Ethnic and cultural diversity may be associated to migration, at some stages of the process,
and may have an additional impact upon risk sharing, whose direction, however, is not clear
ex ante. Some diversity may be needed, for migration to exert a beneficial effect on risk
sharing, but too much of that may also give rise to conflicts (as highlighted by Montalvo &
Reynal-Querol (2005)) and reduce trust, and therefore be detrimental to risk sharing.
By using data on US states in the period 2000-2015, our results will be highly suggestive
of a beneficial (even to a large extent) effect of migration on regional risk sharing. In fact,
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it is possible to compute a level of migration corresponding to almost full risk sharing.
Moreover, we are able to detect a key contribution of migrants’ diversity in this risk sharing
enhancing effect of migration.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises some of the
salient literature on migration, cultural diversity and risk sharing. Section 3 presents the
risk sharing model, which is standard in the literature. Section 4 illustrates the data, the
diversity measure we adopt in the analysis, while Section 5 explains the empirical proce-
dure to assess the impact of migration and diversity on risk sharing. Section 6 discusses
the empirical results. Section 7 concludes, with an eye to some policy implications of our
results.
2 Literature
This paper mainly contributes to two streams of literature. First, it discusses one new chan-
nel through which a country’s economic performance, in terms of its capability to share
risks, is affected by the presence of migrants. Secondly, it also provides some new evi-
dence by looking at the additional effect onto risk sharing due to the variety of “cultures”
(reflecting migrants’ countries of origin) rather than considering only the share of migrant
population. In so doing, our evidence will also point at the existence of networks among
migrants that might foster risk sharing.
Classic research on the economics of migration often analyses the consequences of migra-
tion on the functioning of economic systems, as well as its drivers (Lucas (2005)). In this
paper, we focus on the former, by considering a new way that the foreign born might enrich
the spectrum of economic opportunities of the host country.
Among the channels that have been extensively studied in recent literature, a relative con-
sensus has been reached on the growth enhancing effects of migration. De Haan (1999)
looks in particular at the effects of labour migration on agricultural and rural development,
and in the wake of King (1996) and Skeldon (1997)’s positive conclusions, he advocates
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policies that facilitate and complement its economic contribution, such as discrimination
reducing interventions. Similarly, The World Bank (2009) recognises that movements of
labour are determined by the benefits of agglomeration, and that effective policies should
not prevent people from moving, but from moving for the wrong reasons.
Effects of migration on the wage distribution of natives have also been widely explored in
the literature, although with conflicting evidence. While Borjas (2003) estimates a definite
negative impact, Butcher & Card (1991) and Card & Lewis (2007) find little effect and
mainly on wages of unskilled natives. On the other hand, Ottaviano & Peri (2006) take into
account complementarity effects and propose evidence for a positive impact on US work-
ers’ wages.
A recent stream of literature relates migration to innovation and entrepreneurship, which
has been shown to be for instance correlated with scientific education and which, according
to Wadhwa et al. (2008), is peculiar of specific categories of migrants.
More recently, a different albeit closely related stream of literature has made a step for-
ward, toward analysing the economic effects of ethnic and cultural diversification fostered
by migration. The effect of cultural diversity on social and economic outcomes has been
formulated and tested under many different respects in the last decades, sometimes produc-
ing, depending on the approach, different conclusions. The motivation behind such great
interest lies in the idea that some inherited cultural specific traits and beliefs might, through
their persistence, affect micro and macro economic variables, not necessarily in a positive
way. Alesina & La Ferrara (2005), for instance, highlight the importance for productivity
and innovation of having individuals that interpret problems and use cognitive skills differ-
ently. Guiso et al. (2006), believe this effect to act through the values that are transmitted
by older generations. Similarly, Tabellini (2010) defines culture by indicators such as trust
and respect for others, while Gören (2014) considers a wider set of transmission channels
to connect culture specific traits to economic performance, such as investment behaviour,
political freedom or fertility.
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Different types of indicators have been formulated in order to disentangle the effect of cul-
tural diversity. Ottaviano&Peri (2006) use ameasuremade popular byMauro (1995) to test
its effect on wages and rents in the United States. Following the model in Roback (1982),
they find cultural diversity is a “production amenity”, i.e. one that has positive effect on both
wages and rents, and conclude that “a multicultural urban environment makes US born citi-
zens more productive”. Bellini et al. (2013) repeat the same experiment using 15 European
countries, and find a positive correlation between diversity and productivity. Alesina et
al. (2016) use the same measure of diversity (or fractionalisation), based on birthplace, and
found it is positively correlated with long run economic output. Similarly, Trax et al. (2015)
show how cultural diversity among employees in German plants, and in particular the num-
ber of different nationalities, rather than the group size, increases total factor productivity
at the firm level. Furthermore, the findings in Rodríguez-Pose & Hardy (2015) suggest that
diversity in England and Wales has favored entrepreneurship: in particular, cultural diver-
sity among highly skilled workers shows the strongest effect on start-up intensities. Ager
& Brückner (2013) distinguish between fractionalisation, increasing linearly in the num-
ber of different groups within a country’s population, and polarisation, whose maximum
is reached when the population splits in two equally sized groups. In their experiment on
US immigration data for the period 1870-1920, the former is found to significantly increase
output per capita while the latter, by capturing the potential presence of conflicts and riots,
has an opposite effect. More recently, Bove & Elia (2017) find that both fractionalisation
and polarisation exert a positive effect on real GDP per capita, but more so in developing
countries. Finally, in their path breaking contribution, Ashraf & Galor (2013) argue that
diversity, genetically intended, has a hump-shaped effect on development.
In this paper we start employing an index as used in Ottaviano & Peri (2006), but depart
from it in order to disentangle the effect of diversity from pure migration stocks effect. The
construction of this new index is illustrated in Section 4.
The second stream of literature to which this work relates is that of risk sharing, and in
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particular consumption smoothing in the presence of migration.
As shown by the pioneering work of Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and Townsend (1994),
the theory and the empirics of risk sharing have firstly developed looking at microeconomic
structures, and centering on the behaviour of households or individuals. Many consump-
tion insurance tests were carried out by using microdata (Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991),
Hayashi et al. (1996), Attanasio &Davis (1996), Grande&Ventura (2002), Krueger & Perri
(2005), Krueger & Perri (2011), and a lot more). At the same time, risk sharing was also
investigated at the macro level, within the literature on international risk sharing - based
on a representative-agent analog of the micro set-up - and which has introduced, both the-
oretically and empirically, the notion of risk sharing channels, as in the seminal paper by
Asdrubali et al. (1996). More recently, many other papers (Ambrus et al. (2014), Cabrales
et al. (2017), Fitzsimons et al. (2018), Woldemichael & Gurmu (2018), among the others)
have analysed the risk sharing properties of networks, both theoretically and empirically.
This recent path taken by the risk sharing literature is quite closely related to our main
topic, which empirically evaluates the risk sharing enhancing role of migrants’ networks. In
fact, the topic of migration and risk sharing has also been dealt with in the recent literature,
but always from the perspective of the countries from which migration originates1. This is
the case, for instance, of Balli & Rana (2015), focusing on the role of remittances in pro-
viding risk sharing, or of De Weerdt & Hirvonen (2016), highlighting the effects of internal
migration on the welfare of extended family members at home. Moreover, nothing has been
said to date about the potential effects of migration-induced diversity on risk sharing. Our
aim, therefore, is to fill both gaps in the literature, by understanding whether immigration
and diversity may have a sizeable impact on risk sharing in the receiving communities. The
underlying idea is that immigration may foster risk sharing by introducing or enhancing
informal smoothing channels, such as solidarity among households of the same or similar
ethnic groups, informal finance, informal job recruitment (as illustrated in Sanders et al.
1However, the risk sharing effects of interstate migration were at least partially dealt with in Asdrubali et
al. (1996).
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(2002)). Social ties may be very strong within and across migrants’ communities, as inter-
estingly argued by Portes & Sensenbrenner (1993), and more recently by Herdağdelen et
al. (2016), and may also spill over to native communities. The comprehensive review on
migrants’ social network in Ryan et al. (2015) confirms that this so-called “migrant capi-
tal” has been shown to facilitate settlement and help individuals once established in a new
country.
Although works on risk sharing in social networks are sparse, some studies support the ex-
istence of potential for informal insurance within migrants’ communities. Among these,
Ambrus et al. (2014) develop a theoretical model that predicts that, when individual’s con-
nections serve as social collateral, resources are shared among local groups, and the effec-
tiveness of these arrangements depends on the network’s extension. Jain (2015) uses instead
a laboratory experiment implemented in Kenya to show that, with imperfect monitoring, in-
dividuals that are socially close (as measured by living in the same village or belonging to
the same ethnic group) engage in significantly more risk sharing than those that are distant.
Evidence from villages in Côte d’Ivoire (Grimard (1997)) has also found that partial insur-
ance is provided through informal risk sharing arrangements within members of the same
ethnic groups, especially when formal financial resources are missing. Finally, some very
interesting insight as to the working of migrant communities’ networks in providing all sort
of support, including risk sharing related assistance, to newcomers is provided in Munshi
& Rosenzweig (2016).
3 The Model
Let us consider a very simple economy, where agents maximise a time-separable expected
utility function defined over a single consumption good. Uncertainty is represented by S
mutually exclusive states of the world, at every time period t, each one representing a com-
plete description of the fundamentals of the economy. By solving the planner’s problem we
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can obtain the Pareto-optimal consumption allocations, which is also characterised by full
risk sharing. The planner maximises the weighted sum of individual households’ utilities
subject to the feasibility constraint, i.e. that at each period and in each state of the world
(in short, at each date-event pair (t, s)) the sum of household consumptions is matched by
the sum of the corresponding endowments. The first order conditions of this maximisation





t ) = µt,s, j = 1, ..., J (1)
where ρj is household j′s time preference, λj its Pareto weight (which can be shown to
be inversely related to its endowment), δj is a taste parameter and µt,s the Lagrange multi-
plier associated with the aggregate feasibility constraint at date event pair (t, s), divided by
the probability of date-event pair (t, s). The importance of this condition is that it already
shows that, at an optimum, households’ marginal utility is independent of individual house-
hold’s endowment. Dividing the expression (1) at two different date-event pairs eliminates
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This expression tells us that the marginal rate of substitution between two any date-event
pairs, (t,s) and (t’, s’) is the same across households and independent of individual house-
hold’s endowments. If we now specify the instantaneous utility function to be of the CRRA



















)− log (ρj)] (3)
where γj is household j′s risk aversion coefficient. The Pareto optimal solution, which
is characterised by the planner’s ability to redistribute income and consumption across all
dates and states of the world, and thus by full risk sharing, implies that consumption growth
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across any two date-event pairs (in practice, consumption growth over two periods), only
depends on aggregate endowments, as represented by the Lagrange resource multipliers,
while is totally independent of individual specific variables (income or other kind of id-
iosyncratic shocks).
At the other extreme, when it is not possible to effect any redistribution of income or con-
sumption between any two date-event pairs, idiosyncratic shocks cannot be smoothed (risk
cannot be shared) and households end up consuming their respective endowments at any
















The Pareto optimal solution, and the ensuing irrelevance of idiosyncratic shocks to house-
holds’ consumption, can also be achieved in a decentralised way, by an economy charac-
terised by complete markets, or by ex post arrangements, such as taxation and transfers,
informal transfers among households, or by using up one’s own savings, or resorting to
credit markets. Financial and credit markets, public transfers and taxation, and informal
transfers can, therefore, be used to effect redistributions of income and consumption across
periods and states of the world, and possibly get to a full risk sharing allocation.
Be as it may, the analysis sketched above has been used to define standard risk sharing (or
consumption insurance) tests, which are based on regressions of the form:
∆c̃it = α + β∆ỹit + εit , (5)
where ∆c̃it is idiosyncratic consumption growth (i.e. an individual specific shock to con-
sumption at time t), and ∆ỹit is the corresponding growth in idiosyncratic income (i.e.
individual specific shock to income). The regression coefficient β measures the sensitivity
of idiosyncratic consumption to idiosyncratic income, and has also been taken to gauge the
extent of the departure from the hypothesis of perfect risk sharing (i.e. the case of β = 0,
or perfect insurability of idiosyncratic shocks). A smaller β corresponds to a larger amount
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of risk sharing at work in the economy, as the effect of idiosyncratic shocks to income are
better smoothed by various insurance channels at work in the economy. Expression (5) can
also be obtained by a rather different argument, albeit intuitively appealing, drawn from the
model by Crucini (1999), and Artis & Hoffmann (2012), and based on an explicit process
of income pooling. Defining by λ the share of income pooled by individuals, assuming
constant proportionality between consumption and permanent income, one obtains:
c̃it = (1− λ)ỹit + φi + εit (6)
in log levels, and
∆c̃it = (1− λ)∆ỹit + φi + ηit (7)
in log differences, where the tilde indicates differences from the corresponding per capita
value (identifying the idiosyncratic components of consumption and income). As it cap-
tures the share of income pooling among members of states or regions, λ can be impacted
upon by several variables, including the share of foreign born population, possibly featuring
higher levels of income pooling, as suggested in the review of the literature. (1-λ) is the
equivalent of β in expression (5), and it is also a measure of lack of consumption insurance
(originating from incomplete income pooling).
In many recent contributions (see for example, Mélitz & Zumer (1999), Mélitz (2004) and
Kose et al. (2009)), one or more independent variables have been interacted with idiosyn-
cratic income shocks, tomeasure the impact of those variables on the amount of risk sharing.
The risk sharing regression then becomes:
∆c̃it = α + β∆ỹit + γXit∆ỹit + εit , (8)
where Xit is a vector of variables thought to affect risk sharing. The overall risk sharing
coefficient will therefore be equal to β+γXit, where γ measures the impact of variableXit
on overall risk sharing. If γ is negative, variable Xit increases overall risk sharing, while
the opposite is true if γ is positive.
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We will use equation (8) in the sequel, as we will try to assess the impact of both migra-
tion and cultural diversity on risk sharing. To identify the idiosyncratic components of
consumption and income growth we will follow Fuleky et al. (2018), and use the Pesaran
(2006) CCE estimator, in its two step version: we will first regress consumption and income
growth rates upon the cross-sectional means of consumption and income growth rates, and
then retain the residuals from such regressions as the idiosyncratic components, to be used
in (5) and (8). Although the more standard simple demeaning would generate quantitatively
similar results in terms of regression’s coefficients, CCE does yield better estimates from a
statistic viewpoint.
4 Data
Our dataset includes variables from different sources, whose main descriptive statistics are
provided in Table 1. It is a panel composed by 50 cross-sectional units (49 states2 and one
federal district) observed over the period 2000-2015. The variables used for the main em-
pirical specifications include each state average income, measured by real per capita GDP,
personal non durable consumption expenditure, the share of foreign born over state popu-
lation, denoted as Migration, and a measure of diversity. The first two variables are made
available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), while the latter two are aggregations
of IPUMS USA microdata. As can be seen from the descriptives in Table 1, consumption,
income and migration display quite a large amount of variability, both across time and ge-
ography. The computation of the diversity index is detailed in the following section. Apart
from migration and diversity, the other variables have been used for robustness checks, to
perform a few regressions of migration on a set of possible determinants which may also be
connected to risk sharing, as will be more clearly illustrated below. Among these variables,
employment rate, share of people with an undergraduate degree, and the wage and salary
income are IPUMS aggregations, the share of GDP for each economic sector has been re-
2We only consider mainland US states, in the interest of sample homogeneity.
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trieved from the BEA, while exports, and welfare expenditures are obtained from the US
Census Bureau Government Finances and Foreign Trade sections. Note that as imports
were only available for a subperiod, only exports (highly correlated with imports whenever
both are available) have been used as a measure of openness. Savings are computed as
disposable income net of personal consumption expenditure (BEA). All nominal measures
have been deflated by the 2010 Consumer Price Index.




Consumption (∆%) 0.0124 0.0142 -0.573 0.0745 750
Income (∆%) 0.0078 0.0246 -0.0960 0.1764 750
Migration 0.0902 0.0622 0.0116 0.2839 800
DIm 0.8664 0.0928 0.4918 0.9655 800
Employment Rate 0.7161 0.0457 0.6017 0.8267 800
Per capita GDP 48171.76 18172.04 28856.00 170687.00 800
Primary Sector 0.0449 0.0622 0.0000 0.3460 792
Tertiary Sector 0.6220 0.0760 0.3922 0.7881 800
Public Sector 0.1455 0.0430 0.0879 0.3842 800
Undergraduate Degrees 0.1224 0.0229 0.0645 0.2022 800
Exports 0.0695 0.0380 0.0081 0.2696 800
Total Welfare 2189.14 370.55 1083.89 3445.87 800
Savings 0.0697 0.0581 -0.1092 0.2429 800
Wage and Salary Income 38561.85 6099.10 27637.39 62566.24 800
Notes: Consumption and Income are expressed in log differences. Migration is the ratio of foreign born
over total population in the same state. DIm the Diversity Index calculated for the foreign born population.
Employment Rate is the ratio of employed people in a state over total state population. Per capita GDP is
calculated in 000 of US Dollars. Primary, Tertiary and Public Sector refer to the share of GDP allocated to
each of those industry sectors in each state. Undergraduate Degrees in the share of population in a state whose
maximum education is a the undergraduate level. Exports is the value of exports of each state as a share of
their GDP. Total Welfare is the sum of the average per person social security income and average per person
welfare income, and it is calculated in 000 of dollars. Savings the share of the state’s average per person
savings as a share of disposable income, with per person savings are calculated as the difference between
disposable income and personal consumption expenditure. Wage and Salary Income is calculated in 000 of
dollars. All monetary values are in real terms, as deflated by the 2010 Consumer Price Index.
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5 Method
One of the most common measures of diversity is the frequently used (as, for instance, in
Ottaviano & Peri (2006) and in Alesina et al. (2016)) Diversity index. For state s in year t















where CoBist is the number of residents born in country i, TPst is the total population of
the state, and M the number of different cultural/ethnic groups that are potentially present
on the territory.
Table 2: Correlation coefficients
Diversity index Migration DIm
Diversity index 1.000
Migration 0.998 1.000
DIm -0.134 -0.143 1.000
Notes: Diversity index is calculated as in equation (7). Migration is the share of foreign
born for each state and year. DIm the Diversity index calculated for the foreign born
population.
The diversity (or fractionalisation) index yields the probability that two individuals ran-
domly drawn from the population of the state are born in different countries. Note that we
only explicitly consider the groups that represent a share of the population of at least 0.5%,
while all the others are regrouped in a residual category.
It turns out that the Diversity index can be expressed as the sum of two components,
one representing diversity between natives and all foreign born and the other looking at
differences within the immigrants groups. As a matter of fact, they both depend, in a multi-
plicative way, on the share of migrants over total population, which in turn implies that the
correlation between the share of foreign born population and the Diversity index is likely
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to be very high. Following the steps in Alesina et al. (2016), the index can be decomposed
as
DIst = DIbetween +DIwithin =




where share1 is the share of native population and DIm follows the same construction of
DI but for the foreign born population only.
Indeed, in our sample the correlation is close to unity, as shown in Table 2. Therefore,
we cannot use both migration and diversity as distinct regressors in the same equation.
To be able to analyse both migration and diversity effects on risk sharing we resort to an
alternative identification strategy, in the spirit of Alesina et al. (2016), whereby we use as
independent variables both the share of foreign born and the Diversity index calculated for
the migrant population DImst according to the following specification:
∆c̃st = α + β∆ỹst + γ1Migrationst∆ỹst + γ2DImst∆ỹst + εst , (11)
Figures (1) and (2) represent for comparison the distribution of these two variables in
the first and last year of observation. The two maps provide with a visual representation
of the desired property of the two measures, which appear not to be overlapping for most
states. Although variations in migration and diversity across years are not striking, there
is indeed a large and rather visible difference, in both periods, between the two migration
related phenomena. In fact we can also check, in Table 2, that the correlation between























Figure 2: Migration (a) and DIm (b) in 2015.
We run the model in equations (5) and (8) for the main specifications. In particular, the
fact that both ∆c̃it and ∆ỹit are variations from the cross-sectional means of consumption
and income allows us to omit time dummies. Moreover, after running the Hausman spec-
ification test we could not reject the null hypothesis of the random effect estimator being
consistent and efficient. Therefore, this estimator is used for the regressions reported in Ta-
ble 3 and Table 5. By the same test procedure, the auxiliary regressions in Table 4 employ
instead fixed effect estimators.
6 Results
Table 3 illustrates the main results of our analysis. All coefficients are estimated pre-
cisely, and point at a positive effect of both diversity measures. In column (3) we include a
quadratic term for the share of foreign born, to capture possible non linearities in the impact
of migration upon risk sharing.
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Table 3: Migration, Diversity and Risk Sharing.
Consumption shocks
(1) (2) (3)
Income shocks 0.1886*** 0.7315*** 0.9517***
(0.02) (0.24) (0.26)
Income shocks * Migration -1.8427*** -5.1826***
(0.44) (1.54)
Income shocks * DIm -0.4593* -0.5608**
(0.26) (0.27)
Income shocks * Migration2 14.5922**
(6.45)
R2 0.0857 0.1072 0.1133
Observations 750 750 750
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consumption and Income shocks are calculated as
detailed in Section 2. In columns (2) and (3) Migration is the ratio of foreign born over total population in the same state. DIm is
the Diversity Index calculated for the foreign born population.
A cursory look at coefficients and their statistical significance indicates that the overall
degree of risk sharing is quite high but not full, around 81%, which is remarkably close
to other results in the literature at the regional level (for example, Asdrubali et al. (1996)
estimate the overall level of risk sharing at the same 81% in the period 1981-1990 for US
states). In the second column we estimate equation (8), where income shocks are interacted
with the percentage of foreign born in each state, and the sign of the interacted coefficient
is negative, revealing a risk sharing increasing effect of the stock of migrants. However,
column (3) also contains a quadratic interaction, with a positive and significant estimated
coefficient, showing that the positive impact of migration on risk sharing is not monotonic,
but decreases as migration grows over a certain threshold. In our dataset, this threshold is
around 18% of foreign born population, quite close to the 90th percentile of the share of
migrants across mainland US states in the considered time frame. This share of foreign
born population is associated to a minimum in the overall coefficient on the income shocks
(i.e., accounting for both the linear and the quadratic effects), of around 0.006, when mi-
grant diversity is set at its mean value across states, which corresponds to almost perfect
consumption insurance (over 99% of idiosyncratic shocks to income are smoothed). This
is the main and most remarkable finding in our analysis: migration exerts a positive, and
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possibly strong, effect on risk sharing. However, migration must be complemented by di-
versity to achieve the best result. In fact, migration without diversity does not reduce the
risk sharing coefficient (i.e. improve risk sharing) as effectively (column 2, setting diversity
to 0), while it can reduce it almost to zero with an average value of diversity (column (3)).
On the other hand, if we fix the share of migrants to its minimum over states and years,
diversity may bring about a reduction in the risk sharing coefficient (hence an increase in
risk sharing) by about 50%. Therefore, confirming the many results in the recent literature
that were reviewed above, diversity is not a secondary trait of migration, also in relation to
risk sharing.
Also, as mentioned in the data section, we would like to make sure that the results we
get, in terms of risk sharing enhancing effects of migration, are not driven by underlying
factors, for which migration itself might be a proxy. To check that this is not the case, and
since we could not find adequate instruments to run a proper IV estimation, the original
migration variable is replaced by the residuals of the equation reported in column (1) of
Table 4, where migration is regressed on a set of possible determinants, which are thought
to influence risk sharing. In other words, we purge migration of the indirect effects of other
variables, possibly correlatedwith risk sharing. Fixed effects are also used in the regressions
in Table 4, to account for regional unobserved heterogeneity.
Indeed, as we observe in Table 4, some risk sharing related variables are correlated with
migration. For some variables the correlation is very weak, as revealed by the magnitude
of the estimated coefficient (as for per capita GDP and undergraduate education), and from
the difference in the R squared obtained with and without the variable (as in the case of total
welfare expenditures, which is possibly the variable most directly related to risk sharing).
For other variables the correlation with migration is opposite with respect to their expected
effect on risk sharing (as for savings and wage and salary income), which constitutes an
indirect confirmation of the robustness of our findings.
The results reported in Table 5, which uses this new, filtered, migration variables, broadly
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Table 4: Migration and risk sharing related variables.
Migration
(1) (2) (3)
Employment Rate -0.0476** 0.0092 -0.0684***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Per capita GDP 0.0008** 0.0001 0.0007**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Primary Sector 0.0002 -0.0197 0.0062
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Tertiary Sector 0.1003*** -0.0224 0.1128***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Public Sector 0.0405 0.2001** 0.0006
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Undergraduate Degrees 0.3698*** -0.0576 0.4431***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Exports 0.0469 -0.0084 0.0505*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Per capita Total Welfare 0.0057* -0.0218***
(0.00) (0.00)
Savings -0.0132 -0.0167 -0.0102
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Wage and Salary Income -0.0009** -0.0004 -0.0008**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Time fixed effects NO YES NO
Observations 792 792 792
R2 0.578 0.697 0.573
Notes: Fixed Effects regressions with robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Migration is
the ratio of foreign born over total population in the same state. Employment Rate is the ratio of employed
people in a state over total state population. Per capita GDP is calculated in 000 of US Dollars. Primary,
Tertiary and Public Sector refer to the share of GDP allocated to each of those industry sectors in each state.
Undergraduate Degrees in the share of population in a state whose maximum education is a the undergraduate
level. Exports is the value of exports of each state as a share of their GDP. Total Welfare is the sum of the
average per person social security income and average per person welfare income, and it is calculated in 000
of dollars. Savings the share of the state’s average per person savings as a share of disposable income, with
per person savings are calculated as the difference between disposable income and personal consumption
expenditure. Wage and Salary Income is calculated in 000 of dollars. All monetary values are in real terms,
as deflated by the 2010 Consumer Price Index.
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Table 5: Migration, Diversity and Risk Sharing.
Consumption shocks
(1) (2) (3)
Income shocks 0.1886*** 0.6501*** 0.7099***
(0.02) (0.24) (0.24)
Income shocks * Migration -1.7425*** -2.5350***
(0.52) (0.65)
Income shocks * DIm -0.5537** -0.6761**
(0.28) (0.28)
Income shocks * Migration2 15.1201**
(7.54)
R2 0.0857 0.1013 0.1062
Observations 750 742 742
Notes: Random effects GLS regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consumption and Income shocks are calculated as
detailed in Section 2. In columns (2) and (3) Migration is the ratio of foreign born over total population in the same state. DIm the
Diversity Index calculated for the foreign born population.
confirm those reported in Table 3, with some small differences in the estimated coefficients.
7 Conclusions
Many recent contributions in the literature have tried to evaluate the economic consequences
of migration, both on the migrants’ countries of origin and destination. This paper is meant
to fill in a gap in this literature, by showing the effects of migration and ethnic diversity on
risk sharing, at the regional level. Risk sharing is a key issue in any economy, as it has a
direct impact on welfare, and an indirect impact on growth via investments and savings. We
showed that migration has a positive and quite sizeable effect on risk sharing, but also that
there is a threshold over which it can worsen an economy’s performance in terms of risk
sharing. However, this threshold is quite large, at least in the case of US states. This result
is not too surprising, if we recall that migrants often come from developing countries, where
income fluctuations abound (due to weather, diseases, natural disasters, etc...) and where
rather efficient informal risk sharing arrangements have been arranged and commonly used.
These mechanisms are often based on local obligations, which sometimes reach out to es-
tablish a situation of almost full insurance, as noted by Townsend (1994).
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In view of the very high correlation of the foreign born share of population with a variable
capturing ethnic diversity, the empirical effect of migration might also indirectly include, at
least to some extent, the effects of diversity. Therefore, we have disentangled the two effects
by separately including migrants and diversity among migrants, thus highlighting a distinct
and sizeable beneficial effect of diversity on risk sharing. According to some contributions
in organizational theory, surveyed in Horwitz & Horwitz (2007), where diversity was de-
scribed as a “double edged sword”, too much diversity might generate a decrease in trust,
an increase in conflicts, and other negative outcomes. Also, the “Out of Africa” hypothesis
(Ashraf & Galor (2013)) where diversity, genetically intended, has a non monotonic effect
on development, seems to indicate a hump shaped effect of diversity. Our analysis could
not detect any non linear effect in the impact of diversity3, which calls for further empirical
research in this direction.
In terms of policy implications, our results point at the need to favour integration measures
to enhance risk sharing, at least at the regional level, and to avoid too much polarisation, as
a more balanced mix of immigrant residents seems to be preferable to better smooth shocks
to consumption.
8 Data availability statement
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author,
Luigi Ventura, upon reasonable request.
3Results for this regression specification are available upon request from the authors.
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